INTRODUCTION
IN THE LAST FEW YEARS, we have witnessed the development of a theory of optimal auction design in which the central problem is to identify the auctions which will yield the greatest possible expected profit to the seller (see [2, 10, 13, 19, 20] ; the introduction to [12] presents a very nice sketch of the recent literature). In this literature, the seller of good has only imperfect information regarding the characteristics (or "types") of the potential buyers. Under these circumstances, the market solution (setting a price and selling to any buyer willing to pay that price) is generally sub-optimal, even if the price is judiciously chosen. Other types of selling strategies are usually better: for instance, when there is one unit of an indivisible object to be sold, Vickrey-type auctions [3 and 21] in which the highest bidder receives the object but pays the price announced by the second highest bidder are optimal in a wide variety of settings [4, 8, 19, 20] .
The construction of an optimal auction is a problem of designing a resource allocation mechanism. This mechanism defines a game played by the bidders. The set of possible actions of a bidder is identified with the set of his possible bids and the outcome is an allocation of the good and a payment to the seller by some or all of the bidders. Typically, the following assumptions are made. (This outline is inspired by [12] .) ASSUMPTION A: The auctioneer is trying to sell a fixed quantity of a good, which can be indivisible, as in the case of an objet d'art, or divisible, for example in the case of Treasury bill auctions (see Harris and Townsend [5] ). When production costs are introduced, they are of the constant returns to scale variety (see, for instance, [3] ).
information for which the relevant equilibrium notion is that of Bayesian equilibrium defined in Harsanyi [6] . (We do not discuss here assumptions of risk neutrality; see [14 and 15] for studies of the role of risk aversion.)
Under these assumptions, the seller is in general unable to extract the full surplus from the buyers. He would be willing to pay to have the types of the agents revealed to him before he organizes the mechanism.
The main result of this paper states that if we change Assumption D above, and assume that the bidders have "enough" (in a sense to be defined precisely later) information about each other's characteristics, the seller will be able to extract the full surplus from the buyers and would refuse to pay for information about the characteristics of the buyers. In some sense, he is able to use the information that the buyers have about each other as if it were his own. In many applications, this assumption is very natural. Consider for instance, the case of an auction for oil drilling rights. At the time of the auction, buyers have usually conducted geological tests and their characteristics are the results of these tests. Because the outcomes of the different tests are correlated, each buyer has more information than the seller regarding the characteristics of other buyers. (Of course, a complete model of this phenomenon would treat the information gathering of the buyers as endogenous, but we do not do this in this paper. See Lee [9] and Matthews [16] for treatments of endogenous information acquisition.
The preceding example also shows that Assumption C above is in general not satisfied. If a buyer knew the result of the tests of others, his willingness to pay for drilling rights would be modified. In this paper, we relax Assumption C. This leads us to introduce conditions regarding the dependence of a bidder's utility function on the characteristics of other buyers. We believe these conditions to be new in the literature. (Milgrom and Weber [17] and Myerson [19] also allow for some interdependence between the utility functions.)
Our main result is proved for a divisible object and the results are reinterpreted in terms of an auction for an indivisible object (see Section 4) . But, in the case of a divisible object, we relax the assumption that there is a fixed amount of the good to be sold. We assume that the seller can produce the good at some cost and present two sets of assumptions under which our main result holds, one set for the case where production exhibits increasing returns to scale and another for the case where it exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
When the utility functions of the bidders are independent of the characteristics of other bidders, we can prove that there exists an optimal auction admitting a dominant strategy equilibrium. Actually, as long as the agents are risk neutral, this is true of all optimal auctions which we know of in the literature, whether or not Assumption D holds. Although the problem is usually set up as that of finding the best Bayesian auction (i.e., the best auction which admits a Bayesian equilibrium), the optimal Bayesian auction can be implemented as a dominant strategy equilibrium (see [19] ). However when the utility function of the bidders do depend on the characteristics of other bidders, this property does not hold in our framework. Then we utilize an equilibrium concept, called ex-post Nash equilibrium, which states that, after seeing the bids of others, buyers will not want to revise their bids (see also Holmstrom and Myerson [7] and d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1] ). This equilibrium concept is weaker than dominant strategy, but stronger than Bayesian.
These results are presented in Sections 2 and 3 of the paper. Section 4 shows how they specialize to the case of an auction for an indivisible object. Section 5 presents a proof of the main result of Section 3.
Before proceeding, we must point out our debt to Myerson's work. Without his very perceptive example in Section 7 of [191, we would never have progressed along the lines of this paper. We also refer the reader to the independent work of Maskin and Riley [11] which presents a stronger result, the existence of a mechanism which admits only one dominant strategy equilibrium, in a simpler version of our model.
THE MODEL AND EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS
We consider a monopolist who is selling a good to n agents. The cost of producing quantity x of the good is c(x), and we assume that capacity is bounded so that x is constrained to be less than or equal to some number Q >0. This involves no loss of generality, as Q van always be made large enough for this last constraint not to be binding.
We will denote by N = { 1, . . . , n}, n -2, the set of potential buyers, also called bidders. The set of possible characteristics of bidder i will be MiA=1, . . ., mi. His own characteristic, si, will be private information to agent i. The seller has a (subjective) probability distribution rr over the set of states of nature. Without loss of generality, we assume that for every si, 7ri(si) =Z,S -, i r(s, si) is positive.
Having observed si, buyer i has a (subjective) probability distribution i'(-si) over MAi and we impose the following consistency requirement:
This requirement states that all agents and the seller share common probability beliefs.
Under full information, the willingness of agent i to pay for q units of the good will be vi(q; s) if s e M is the vector of characteristics of the agents. Note that we assume that the willingness to pay depends not only on the agent's own characteristic, but on the characteristics of others as well. For other treatments of incomplete information problems with this general dependence, see Milgrom and Weber [17] , Myerson [191, and Holmstrom and Myerson [7] .
Under full information the monopolist's optimal production and selling strategy is determined by solving, for each s E M, the problem R(s) given by:
Here, x' is the payment by bidder i, and q' is the amount of the good allocated to him. Let V(R(s)) be the optimal value of this problem. V(R(s)) is equal to V(R(s)), where R(s) is the following problem:
Ex-ante, the expected value of selling the good under full information is
In order to describe selling strategies under incomplete information, we must first describe the bidders' attitude towards risk. Let yi(.) and 4'(.) be two functions from M_i into R. Then, if agent i is of type si, he evaluates the lottery that assigns to each s_i E M_i a quantity y'(s_i) of the object and a payment 5'(s_i), according to an expected utility of es_M [vi(yi();
Because the seller does not have perfect information, he must design a rule for allocating the object. We assume that this rule asks each agent to reveal his characteristic and that the good is allocated according to the agents' responses. We justify this assumption after introducing our notion of equilibrium. From the point of view of the agents, this rule defines a game of incomplete information which we model following Harsanyi [6] . Let q': M -* R represent the allocation of the good to bidder i and let x': M -> R be his payment. If s E M is the n-tuple of announcements, then bidder i receives q'(s) units of the good and pays x'(s) to the seller. If the true types are s E M and the announced types are e-M, the payoff to bidder i is ui(cr; s) = vi(q'i(); s)-x'(r). An n-tuple {q, X}iEN is an allocation mechanism and will be written {q, x}. The information sets of bidder i will be identified with his types in Mi, and, for each si, Mi (i.e., at each information set), the set of his feasible actions is Mi. A (pure) strategy for i is therefore a function Si: Mi -> Mi.
Following Harsanyi [6] , a strategy n-tuple 8 = (8, S2,..., 8) is a Bayesian equilibrium of the game defined by the mechanism {q, x} if:
where 8- 
If 8 is a Bayesian equilibrium, bidder i adopts the following reasoning: "8i is my best response to the strategies 8-i of the other bidders given that I only know the conditional distribution of their true types." Although bidders cannot observe each other's types, they must guess each other's strategies and react to these guesses by making sure that their own strategies are the best responses to these guesses.
A much stronger equilibrium concept would have bidder i reason in the following way: "Si is my best response to 8-i whatever their true types." This implies that for all s e M, (86 (sI),..., 8n (Sn)) is a Nash equilibrium in the complete information normal form game with payoff functions ui( ; s) and strategy sets Mi. Formally, we will call (81,..., S,) an ex post Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game if:
This definition implies that every ex post Nash equilibrium is a Bayesian equilibrium. Of course, in our model, a bidder can never observe the types of the other bidders. Thus, the concept of ex post Nash equilibrium corresponds to the following reasoning by agent i. "If I believe that the other bidders are using strategies 8-i, then even if I observed their actions, I would have no incentive to change mine." This lack of regret feature does not generally hold for Bayesian equilibria.
It is instructive to compare the concept of ex post Nash equilibrium with that of "dominant strategy" equilibrium but one must make precise the notion of dominant strategy that is being used. An n-tuple (85,..., 8,) is an ex post dominant strategy equilibrium if:
all si e M, all or_i e '-i, and all ti c Mi.
It is clear that ex post dominant strategy equilibria are ex post Nash equilibria. In the game of imperfect but complete information derived from the game of incomplete information, a dominant strategy equilibrium is an n-tuple (81,..., 8n) such that
s, E Mi for all ti E M,, all i e N, and all strategies S_i of the players in N\i.
This notion of dominant strategy equilibrium is the usual one for games of complete information.
Let Al, A2, A3, A4 be, respectively, the sets of ex post dominant strategy equilibria, dominant strategy equilibria, ex post Nash equilibria, and Bayesian equilibria. Then we have Al c A2 c A4 and Al c A3 c A4 but there is no general containment relation for A2 and A3.
In this paper, our main results will use the concept of ex post Nash equilibrium. We also restrict ourselves to mechanisms in which each bidder is induced to announce his true characteristic. This is possible because the revelation principle (see Myerson [18] and Harris and Townsend [15] ) holds for ex post Nash mechanisms. The formal proof is straightforward and is omitted. Mechanisms which induce truthful behavior as ex post Nash equilibria have been studied independently by Holmstrom and Myerson [7] who label them "uniformly incentive compatible." In the special case where the utility functions are independent of the characteristics of other agents, these mechanisms have been studied by d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [1] under the name "incentive compatibility under complete ignorance."
The following nonlinear programming problem, E, yields as a solution the best ex post Nash Equilibrium mechanism from the pont of view of the seller: Constraint system El states that {q, x} implements a truthful ex post Nash equilibrium. System E2 states that the mechanism {q, x} is individually rational, i.e. that each bidder would be willing to participate, whatever his type. System E3 consists of obvious feasibility conditions. We will call V(E) the optimal value of problem E.
ASSUMPTIONS AND THE MAIN THEOREM
In this section we list our assumptions and present the main theorem. Given Assumption 2, Assumption 3 is true in a great many applications of economic interest. In two appendices we show that, in particular, Assumption 3 is a consequence of either of Assumptions 3A or 3B below, in the presence of Assumptions 1 and 2. By Assumption 2, v'(q'; s) increases when si increases. If c is convex, then other things being equal, the optimal allocation to agent i increases. Assumption 3A insures that the marginal valuation of the other agents does not increase so fast with si so as to totally counteract this effect and Assumption 3 holds. On the other hand, if c is concave, the optimal quantity allocated to an agent increases when the marginal valuation of another increases. Assumption 3B insures that when si increases the marginal valuations of other agents do not decrease and cause a decrease in q' so that Assumption 3 also holds in this case.
Finally, we state the assumption regarding the bidders' information which we discussed in the introduction: then the buyer's types are not stochastically independent but Assumption 4 is violated since F1 and 12 are singular. We can now state our main result.
THEOREM:
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4:
The theorem states that the full information revenue is attainable not only as a truthful Bayesian equilibrium, but as a truthful ex post Nash equilibrium as well. Given the discussion in the introduction on the relationship between ex post Nash and dominant strategy equilibria, we can now state: COROLLARY 1: If Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold and vi( ; s_ , si) is independent of sifor each i c Nand each siEC Mi, there exists an expost dominant strategy mechanism that yields the same expected revenue as that obtainable under full information.
THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS FOR AN INDIVISIBLE OBJECT
The results of Section 3 can be specialized to the case where the agents are bidding for an indivisible object if we assume that their utility function is of the type vi(q'; s) = wi(s)q' -x', where ql is reinterpreted as the pi'obability of being awarded the object, and xl is, again, the payment. The utility of the seller is 
PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
In order to prove the theorem, we will construct a feasible solution for E with objective function value equal to ysEM T(s) V(R(s)). We first prove some lemmas. Letting ori vary between si,+ and ti and summing, we obtain for ti > si:
which is the first constraint of problem E. A similar proof holds if ti is smaller than si. xi'(s_i, 1) computed from (2). We must prove that the following set of equations, obtained by substitution in (1), has a solution:
for all i e N, si e Mi.
By Assumption 4, there exists a subset Ri of M_i such that the (mi x mi) matrix:
whose rows are indexed by the elements of Ri, is nonsingular. Let xi(s_i, 1) equal zero for all s_i not in Ri. Then the left hand side of equality (3) can be written:
The nonsingularity of C' implies that this system of equations has a solution for all values of the right hand side. Thus, constraint set E2 of problem E is satisfied by (x, q). This proves the lemma and the theorem. By definition V'h(Oh (S'); s') = A (s'), and the contradiction is established.
LEMMA A5: if qi(s')< q(s) and i belongs to N(s'), wyj(s')>~-wi (s).
PROOF:
We will proceed by contradiction. Assume that w,(s') < w,(s). Consider any h c N(s'), with h # i (if there exists any). We have: PROOF:
We will proceed by contradiction. Assume that ,(s') <, (s). First consider any he N(s')\{i}. We have: The proof is similar to that of Lemma A3'. Fihally, we prove that i belongs to N(s').
LEMMA A7: If q'(s') < q'(s), i belongs to N(s').
We will proceed by contradiction. Assume that i does not belong to N(s') and hence q'(s')= 0 by (A9). Consider any h c N(s'). We have: To show this it is sufficient to show that A(s) is less than or equal to A(s'). Indeed, we have A(s) = v'(q'(s); s)a v(q'(s); s')< v'(q'(s'); s') = A(s'). To proceed, we distinguish three cases and a number of subcases: But if this inequality were true {{qJ(s')},,p, {J'(s)j)p}} would be at least as good a solution to R(s') as {qi(s')}J,N, which leads to the contradiction we wanted to establish.
